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PHILOSOPHICAL ADVENTURES OF THE 
IDEA OF EVOLUTION: 1859-1959 
N ESSAY on the philosophy of evolution in the century A since the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species1 
can be written in two sentences. By the end of the first fifty 
years, everybody in the educated world took evolution for 
granted, but the idea was still intellectually exciting and its 
philosophical exploitation was entering upon its period of 
full maturity. By the end of the next fifty years, evolution 
belongs to "common sense7' almost as thoroughly as the 
Copernican hypothesis and other early landmarks of the 
scientific revolution; but the idea is no longer exciting, and 
evolutionary philosophy is out of fashion. 
The following pages will trace the adventures of the idea 
of evolution primarily in its second fifty years. The first fifty 
years were the heroic age of the idea, when it was fervently 
propagated by confident believers, ready and willing to do 
battle against all comers. Many were the dragons of philo- 
sophical and theological error slain in heated polemic. By 
1909, when John Dewey published the perceptive article, 
"Darwin's Influence on Philosophy,"" he could write of vic- 
tories won and triumphs assured. His was a story of old 
error exposed and of new truth to be celebrated. 
Dewey could afford to write with confidence. The excite- 
ment of Danvin's ideas had fertilized thought and investiga- 
tion for half a century, in social studies, ethics, and meta- 
physics no less than in biology. Research could doubtless 
discover how men who were to lead thought in various fields 
had come under the spell of particular Darwinian ideas at 
identifiable stages of their intellectual growth; yet that kind 
of study may not convey a sense of the full impact of the 
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idea of evolution on thought. Thougli Darwin's studies, of 
course, did not originate the idea, they sul-sounded it with 
the aura of scientific prestige in a supreme degree. Evolu- 
tioned captured the imagination of the literate public and 
shaped the outlook of countless men who never read a word 
that Darwin wrote and never achieved a clear notion of 
what he tried to prove. EvoIutionism descended like a flood- 
ing rain on the Western mind; it washed everything, pene- 
trated into every crevice, engulfed some opinions and 
brought life to some that might otherwise have lain much 
longer dolamant. I t  drenched and drowned and fructified- 
wit11 the massive impartiality of eveiy great idea. Men sud- 
dently-from our perspective, in 1959, suddenly-found they 
could no longer think in old ways, Familiar beliefs that had 
always been accepted without question became simpIy 
implausible. Just such a drastic revision of fundamental out- 
look characterized all the major intellectual revolutions- 
notably the early Greek, the Christian, the modem (scien- 
tific) revolution in ideas. Darwin created for his successors a 
new world image or 'root metaphor," or "absolute presup- 
position." After 1859-the date is arbitrary to a degree-the 
older wodd images ceased to mirror the world to men's 
minds, ceased to allude to what seemed relevant to proper 
understanding. The world wore a diEerent look. 
If the foregoing account should give anyone the impression 
of an abrupt or instantaneous change, that would be un- 
fortunate. It goes without saying that the Daiwinian revolu- 
tion did not take place in an instant. Like any other great 
movement of ideas, it worlted its way in the minds of indi- 
vidual men, spreadil~g by a kind of intellectual contagion 
-or conversion-one mind at a time; but its ultimate triumph 
was assured. After 1859 there was no turning back. By the 
end of fifty years, the revolution had been carried through, 
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I t  had become "natural" for educated men to view them- 
selves and the world in an evolutionary perspective. 
Beliefs may become familiar and customary without being 
adequately understood; indeed, this is the rule rather than 
the exception. Adequate analysis and interpretation of ideas, 
the business of philosophy, comes late because it is diEicult. 
Take any key idea (e.g., substance, foim, matter, cause, time, 
space), and its career will confirm this judgment. The case 
of evolution is no exception. Men became accustomed to it 
without clearly grasping either its nature or its implications, 
Precisely in this obscurity lay the task for philosophy, for a 
philosopher is a man with one principal eccentricity: he can- 
not rest until he knows what he believes-in the dual sense of 
knowing what he believes and of knowing what he believes. 
The evolutionai-y philosopher had to deteimine what fea- 
tures imparted to the notion of evolution its transfoiming 
power (thus defining what he believed); and he had to place 
these features in relation to all other fundamental aspects of 
the cosmos so as to be assured of the coherence of his va-ious 
insights (thus coining to know what he believed). 
On a previous page, Dai~vinism was compared to the 
major intellectual revolutions in the history of the Western 
mind. The compaiison referred primarily to the impersonal, 
massive, almost inexorable sweep of the evolutionaiy idea; 
but in scope and basic novelty it hardly belongs in suclz com- 
pany. The Darwinian revolution, important as it has been, is 
no more than an incident in the modern scientific movement. 
Minds that had already undergone the scientific revolution 
could take Darwinism in stride without important modifica- 
tion of fundamental assumptions. Of the major innovations 
this is not true; they alter the whole cast of an epoch's 
thought. 
What Darwin did was to extend the basic scientific atti- 
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tudes over the whole range of biological phenomena. Scienti- 
fically he was conservative, no friend of innovation. He 
nevertheless had the impact of a revolutionary innovator in 
ideas and achieved prompt notoriety in a world presumably 
accustomed, since the Enlightenment of the eighteenth cen- 
tuly, to accept the main tenets of the scientific revolution of 
the seventeenth. We may justly speak of the Darwinian 
revolution, because Darwin brought home to the nineteenth 
centwy some implications of the scientific revolution which 
startled conventional (i.e., unthinking) minds. There resulted 
public agitation and heated dispute that impeded impartial 
philosophical clarification. 
The true significance of evolutionism for philosophy, and 
the real problems which it posed for adequate interpretation, 
were lost from view in the excitement of doing battle against 
manifest incompetence. Ignorance once more was fighting 
and losing a last-ditch battle with critical scientific intelli- 
g e n ~ e ; ~  but the folly of the losers' tactics may have prompted 
the winning side to forrn an exaggerated estimate of its own 
merits. The obscurity of its own systematic ideas was not 
recognized, More importantly, it passed unnoticed that the 
very notion of evolution contained suggestions of a way of 
viewing events quite at variance with the mechanistic root- 
metaphor of the scientific revolution. 
The nineteenth century brought the idea of evolution into 
the center of intellectual ferment. Before Darwin, Herbert 
Spencer had attempted a systematic evolutionary philosophy. 
He exploited the notion of evolution that, from the time of 
Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck in the eighteenth century, 
had enjoyed a more or less lively existence on the speculative 
fringes of European thought. Charles Darwin himself de- 
layed little in drawing far-reaching philosophical conclusions 
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about human morals and progress. Neither Darwin nor Spen- 
cer perceived all the philosophical implications of their cen- 
tral idea. They performed well the service of spreading the 
notion of evolution, but its adequate critical treatment had to 
await the twentieth century. 
By a delightful coincidence, three of the most original in- 
terpreters of the idea of evolution in philosopl-ry were born 
in the very year of publication of The Origin of Species, 
1859: John Dewey, the most American of philosophers, 
prophet of experimental intelligence as the avenue to human 
welfare; Henri Bergson, the brilliant French interpreter of 
the creativity of evolution; and Samuel Alexander, the Aus- 
tralian-English realist philosopher of boldly speculative 
power, who attempted a unique synthesis of evolutionary and 
relativistic cosmology. A fourth and slightly later philosopher 
of the first rank who may be considered to have made funda- 
mental contributions to the philosophy of evolution was Alfred 
North Whitehead. But in his philosophy the idea of evolution 
had already retreated into the background, being absorbed 
into and partially disguised, if not superseded, by the idea of 
organism. I t  is taken up into and transmuted by a philosophi- 
cal construction that with profound originality brings the 
philosophy of emergent novelty back into relation with the 
great Platonic tradition. 
By the late twenties, when Whitehead was at the peak of 
his metaphysical career, the course of philosophy was already 
turning into new channels. There were two of these, and 
they were vastly different from each other as well as from the 
type of philosophy to which the idea of evolution contrib- 
utes. One channel is that of minute logical, linguistic, or posi- 
tivistic analysis-a stubbornly epistemological emphasis that 
shrinks from the extravagance of speculative hypotheses in 
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cosmology. The other channel is that known widely, though 
vaguely, as existentialism. Every leading existentialist, with 
considerable justification, refuses to accept the label; existen- 
tialism, nevertheless, stands for a temper and style of philo- 
sophy strikingly different from that of science-oriented works 
that constitute much of the philosophical bibliography of the 
past century. The one channel is basically sceptical, being 
obsessed by the desire for clear statement and sufficient veri- 
fication. The other may be sceptical, too-of 011s human val- 
ues; but it often exploits this emptiness as preliminary to an 
act of faith. Neither of these pl~ilosoplzical styles lends itself 
to significant exploitation of evolutionary ideas. One is pre- 
occupied with details of logical syntax or of common verbal 
usage; the other is absorbed in the predicament each man on 
eaxth is in-is in. This is the present and only predicament of 
each, and neither an evolutionary past nor ail evolutionary 
future has anything to offer concerning it. 
Darwin showed his scientific conservatism by devising a 
theory of evolution which makes no use of final causes, or 
purposes. One of the most radical innovations of the modein 
epoch of thought had been the rejection of final causes in 
nature. At a stroke, this denial reduced all explanations to 
mechanistic tesnls. That fact was already perfectly clear to 
Descartes, who, boldly consistent, hinted at a cosniic evolu- 
tion of the pl~ysical order we lu~ow; he construed living bodies 
as immensely complex machines and explained their behavior 
in terms of reflex actions triggered by motions impinging on 
them from without. 1.t is still the same with philosophers of 
physical science-however they may debate the exact nature 
of causality, or the meaning in physics of determinism and 
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indeteiminism, or of randomness, none pays a moment's at- 
tention to purposiveness. Nor did Darwin do so in construct- 
ing his concept of evolution. 
It was, in fact, precisely the explanation of evolutionary 
processes without appeal to final causes that fonned the es- 
sence of his originality and gave his Origin of Species the 
character of a revolutionary document. In a sense, Darwin 
said only what scientists had been saying all along. Had he 
not obtained one of his chief clues from Lyell's studies of the 
cumulative record of geological changes through ordinaly 
causes? EIis conservatism had revolutionary impact because 
he described a mechanism of evolution that seemed to ac- 
count for the empirical facts throughout the entire range of 
biological phenomena. You have only to assume random 
minute variations, and natural surroundings making the sur- 
vival of some of these more probable than survival of otl~ers, 
and you have the mechanism of the origin of species. The 
seeming purposiveness of the adaptation of living forms to 
their conditions of life vanishes in a way of looking at them 
that makes no allusion to ends. In the face of the vast quan- 
tity of detailed evidence assembled by Darwin and mar- 
shaled in his works, the doctrine of special creation had to 
be abandoned-that extraordinary blend of bad theology and 
bad Aristotle. Men suddenly discovered stranger ancestors 
than Adam. Pious but uninstructed common sense received a 
shock comparable to that administered by the Copernican 
Ilypothesis. Teleology, already excluded from transactions of 
mere matter in motion, now had to yield the stronghold of 
living things, seemingly so full of purposes. 
To Darwin's credit it may be said that he was not a doc- 
trinaire Darwinian. He seems to have kept a more open mind 
than some of his followers toward the inheritance of ac- 
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quired characteristics, and 'he ended by inconsistently at- 
tributing to evolution a tendency toward greater goodness. 
The consistent core and source of the revolutionary power of 
Darwin was, nevertheless, the mechanizing and naturalizing 
of life over its whole range. His simple theory had stupen- 
dous systematizing power, 
Darwin's scientific conservatism has received most of our 
attention so far. His naturalism-his methodoIogical assump- 
tion that everything in nature has an empirical explanation- 
offered man a new image of himself, or, more accurately, 
confirmed and sharpened the modern scientific image of him. 
This formed, quite understandably, the center about whicll 
the storms of controversy whirled. When the storms at length 
had subsided, leaving only long rollers to disturb the distant 
shores of backward opinion, some philosophers who had 
grown up amidst the intellectual excitement of the first gen- 
eration of Darwinism began to perceive that tile idea of evo- 
lution had more profoundly revolutionary implications for 
phiIosophy than had hitherto been appreciated. They saw 
the situation in different ways; but they all saw that the idea 
of evolution departs radically from the characteristic assump- 
tions of modern scientific naturalism. I t  was evident that the 
fundamentals of the position had to be re-examined. The re- 
examination brought evolutionaiy philosophy to full ma- 
turity. 
The most fundamental notion that had to be looked at  
again was time. Evolutionism forced philosophers to 'take 
time seriously," in Samuel Alexander's well-known phrase. 
This is the sum of Darwin's influence on philosophy at the 
deepest level. AII other problems and attitudes may be con- 
sidered derivative from it. We shall presently remind our- 
selves of some of these more special developments in greater 
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detail, but just now it is appropriate to characterize the new 
feeling for time more exactly. 
Traditionally, time had been, philosophically speaking, "al- 
ways a bridesmaid, never a bride." It was a second-best, as 
defective as it was puzzling. Parmenides' "way of error," 
Plato's "moving image of eternity," the Christian scene of the 
drama of fall and redemption, but primarily the arena of sin 
and corruption-all treat time as finite, incomplete, futile, 
and frustrating. Time stood between man and his nature and 
had to be overcome. Following Hegel's lead, F. H, Bradley, 
Bernard Bosanquet, Josiah Royce, and numerous other ideal- 
ist philosophers of the half-century after 1875, considered 
time unreal. Bradley called it "an appearance which contra- 
dicts it~elf."~ The Absolute alone is real, and it is eternal. Time 
is but one of the innumerable, partial, fragmentary, defective 
appearances of the Absolute to finite beings incapable of 
fully comprehending the eternally Real. Time-and this is of 
the essence of pre-Darwinian tradition-defines a zone of twi- 
light existence, neither quite real nor quite unreal, where 
everything incessantly passes away; true Being, Reality, never 
passes away but forever is. 
The notion of evolution, first implicitly, then expressly, 
reversed the emphasis. Whatever passes away must first 
come-to-be. "Time" in the twentieth century became the 
name for coming-to-be rather than for "perpetual perishing." 
Note how radical the change wrought by stressing the first 
rather than the second member of the inseparable pair, com- 
ing-to-be and passing-away. The emphasis shifts from death 
to birth, from corruption to production, from nullification to 
creation. Time becomes henceforth the condition of signif% 
cant achievement, the inexhaustible fountain of new wonders. 
The great philosophers of evolution are one and all pre- 
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occupied in one way or another, with the creativity of time. 
Time brings forth what never was before and cannot be 
again. Less obstetricalIy expressed, time is precisely the proc- 
ess of coming-to-be, the incessant generation of novelty: 
there is nothing old under the sun. Time, creativity, novelty 
-these form the chord on which the mature philosophers of 
evolution composed their masterpieces. Darwin might per- 
haps have been surprised or even offended by some 01 their 
contentions, but he could hardly disclaim responsibility for 
a unique contribution to the climate in which their opinions 
flourished. 
The three great contemporaries among the philosophers of 
evolution took hold of the new ideas each in his own way. 
Each brought them into relation with his primary philo- 
sophical interests. Each gave a characteristic expression to 
them. Among them, they exploited with genius most of the 
opportunities offered by the new ideas. 
Creativity enters John Dewey's account in the form of 
'cintelligence." It enters Bergson's metaphysics as the e'lan 
'L 
vital, Disguised as emergence,'' it is of the essence of all 
evolutionary process, and thus it enters Alexander's cosmol- 
ogy as the basic fact, All three try to account for the possi- 
bility of novelty and its production in various modes, or at 
various levels of existence, 
In his 1909 essay Dewey singled out the notion that species 
may originate in time as decisive for proper appreciation of 
Darwin's influence on philosophy. If species are not fixed, 
but come and go in time (it seemed plain to Dewey) most of 
the great philosophical tradition had to be rejected, or pro- 
foundly altered. This was, to his mind, a tradition in which 
the formal took precedence over the material, the rational 
over the empirical, the fixed over the fluent, essence over 
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existence. To such a tradition the stark rigidities of formal 
logic were appropriate. But i f  species are not fixed, eternal 
forms or essences determining existence, then they are con- 
tingent forms determined by matters of fact, and logic must 
become radically empirical. Experience alone, not abstract 
ideas, provides knowledge, and experience grows with the 
interaction, the give and take, of the organism and its context 
of actual existence. Neither nature nor experience nor knowl- 
edge is static, unchangeable; none of them is final at any 
moment. The old logic of rational computation with abstrac- 
tions must be set aside as vain and profitless. In its place 
must arise an "experimental logic," the logic of the evolution 
of experience and of ideas. 
True to his Hegelian upbringing, Dewey never ceased to 
regard logic as integral to cosmic development-with, of 
course, a characteristic difference. Logic, or method, is 
simply the way in which experience naturally grows. Experi- 
ence is not only of but in nature; the experiencer is no aloof 
spectator coolly observing a11 time and all existence, but a 
participant learning by interaction with nature; the knower 
is not a mind, but an organism with mental functions. Thus 
Dewey's logic takes more from Danvin than the abstract 
denial of fixed essences: it takes the whole view of man as a 
natural organism surviving by his wits. 
An 01-ganism so considered is an integrated complex of 
functions in dynamic interrelation with environing events in 
nature. It must maintain itself ("itself" is its pattern of activi- 
ties) with the help of nature; but also in the face of natural 
obstacles and threats of many kinds, since nature is impartial. 
The organism, in a word, can never cease its struggle to 
survive. If there are circumstances to which it cannot adapt 
itself or which it cannot modify to suit itself, the organism 
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must disintegrate, die. For Dewey, being an organism is like 
riding a bicycle. If you stop moving, you fall off. 
Also, if you try to ride pell-mell over every stone and pot- 
hole, you will be bumped off. The smart thing to do is to 
look ahead and take precautions, circumventing trouble or 
smoothing away obstacles. Such is the work of intelligence. 
Men are successful biologically because they have wits to 
live by. The fullest development, the product of a long ex- 
perimental histoly, of this wit in practice is the method of 
deliberate experimentation in the face of dif%culties, which 
characterizes modern science and technology. 
Experiment methodically pursued, the central innovation 
and glory of modern science, has been called a "routine of 
di~covery."~ This routine had itself to be learned, or dis- 
covered, in the turmoil of trial and error. I t  is "natural" not 
as instinctive, but as successful in meeting natural conditions. 
I t  works; it turns nature against itself in our favor. But the 
key to its success, as Dewey never tired of emphasizing, is its 
inventiveness. The routine and repetitive, always doing the 
same thing in the same way regardless of circumstances, rep- 
resented to him the epitome of stupidity. Habit is the para- 
digm of unintelligence. Intelligence, on the other hand, is 
always creative, alert to differences and original in response. 
Bare originality for its own sake never appealed to Dewey. 
What mattered was something effective in practice. Organ- 
isms exhibit intelligence by correcting their own mistakes. 
In this way intelligence is a natural product of evolution, 
since it promotes adaptation to environment by alertly avoid- 
ing old blunders while working out more successful ways of 
dealing with the moment-to-moment contingencies of life. 
The foregoing rapid summary makes plain Dewey's ortho- 
dox Darwinism. Mind, from the evol~~tionary point of view, 
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is not a substance independent, in the Cartesian manner, of 
the material substance of the physical world; it is instead a 
group of functions of a brainy organism, which promote sur- 
vival and thus establish the ascendency of intelligent species, 
by natural selection. Like fur or fang, swiftness or ferocity, 
or the opposable tliunlb, mind (or brain in action) is an organ 
of survival. 
Dewey did not re-think the notion of evolution. He took it 
over, virtually intact, from biological science and fitted it into 
a set of philosophical ideas from other sources. Prominent 
among these are logical ideas concerning experimental 
method, and moral, social ideas clothed in pragmatic trap- 
pings but rooted in his New England conscience. He despised 
above all things the hypocrisy of a merely theoretical moral- 
ity that divided and frustrated men. He insisted on checking 
the moral claims of any conduct against actual results. No 
ideal, no motive can be so exalted that its fruits become ir- 
relevant to its nature, Conduct, if it is good, will sweeten in- 
dividual and social life, not by definition or by convention or 
by institutional (e.g., ecclesiastical) authority, but by its na- 
tural consequences in actual experience. The moral man, in 
Dewey's view, must always act intelligently-that is, crea- 
tively and with constant attention to actual results so as to 
correct mistakes in plans and policies. In this manner, Dewey 
combined evolutionism, pragmatism, and experimentalism in 
a coherent system of thought. 
But, like Darwin before him, Dewey expanded the scope 
of evolution from biological life to the whoIe spiritual life of 
man. Darwin had done this almost absent-mindedly and not 
with philosophical thoroughness. Not so Dewey, who was at 
heart always a moral pl~iIosopher. He expanded the scope of 
"nature" until he all but burst the utmost restraints of speci- 
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fic meaning, although he never wavered in his intention to 
pronlote naturalism. But in pressing the concept of nature to 
the utmost, Dewey also exposed aspects of it that mechanism 
had never needed to stress. Nature's actuality is renewed 
from moment to moment, ever fertile, ever pregnant wit11 
novelties, ever promising unprecedented riches of experi- 
ence to those who do not waver in intelligent search for 
the natural means to these new attainments of life. In his 
own way, Dewey belonged to the great tradition of philos- 
ophy: for him, while thought and being are not one and the 
same, experience and nature are. Imbedded in this is the new 
idea of time as fertility. Human experience is a natural part 
of the great adventure of nature. But 'hature" is far from the 
physical world of Descartes, or even of Newton and Maxwell 
and PIanck and Einstein. Dewey himseIf did not subject the 
quasi-mechanistic concept of evolution to the radical criti- 
cism which his mature outlook seems to require. 
Radical criticism was the work of Bergson, of Alexander, 
and, later, of Whitehead. The most brilliant and most orig- 
inal critic of the Darwinian concept of evolution, Henri 
Bergson had published his most valuable works before 
Dewey wrote the essay on the influence of Darwin and years 
before he had completed the statement of his pl~ilosopl~y. 
Scintillating style reinforced the fascination of fresh ideas. 
But such brilliance may also have to pay a price. Excitement 
over some of Bergson's more daring suggestions now seems 
to have diverted attention for a while from the acuteness of 
his fundamental criticism. It was easier to question certain 
of his exaggerations than to take sober measure of His basic 
position. 
With the economy of genius, Bergson summed up his orig- 
inal contribution in the title of his greatest work, Creative 
Euolution."f evolution was to have distinctive meaning, 
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Bergson saw it must express a feature of the universe that 
mechanism can not comprehend. He called this its creativity. 
Evolution implies that something really new comes into be- 
ing; otherwise, we have nothing more than unexciting re- 
arrangements of things in space. But if evolution is creative 
in essence, our scientific way of looking at nature must un- 
dergo drastic revision, We must modify our understanding 
of things and events both on the cosmic scale and on the 
scale of individual event. 
Creativity in its cosmic dimension Bergson sometimes 
called the e'lan oital, "the surge of life." All life, for Bergson, 
expresses this ultimate creative principle. He does not con- 
sider life as the sum of living things; it is rather the surge of 
aspiration that differentiates itself in the myriad specific 
forms of particular life. Bergson sometimes writes of the 
surge of life as if it forms the source of all that is, both of 
life, which is at home in the intimacies of spiritual unity, and 
of matter, which is at home in the external relations of space. 
When the surge of life tires, relaxes its effort, then it degen- 
erates, he suggests, into the inanimation of matter. Extension 
results from de-tension, loss of tension, the cessation of ef- 
fort. 
But Bergson also writes most commonly (for obvious rea- 
sons) of the surge of life as striving to make its way in a ma- 
terial world indigerent to the demands of life. Then it is that 
he may liken the surge of life to a toi-rent that splits itself as 
necessaiy to pass around obstacles or to seek out channels 
wherever they lie, until it fills every crack and crevice with 
its energies. The surge of life overcomes obstacles by a series 
of inventions, creative innovations, or discoveries, which dif- 
ferentiate it into the innumerable species that evolution has 
produced, 
Bergson tries to show that the evolutionary record which 
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the biologists of his generation accepted supported the crea- 
tive conception of evolution rather than the Darwinian mech- 
anistic evolution. For example, the constructing of virtu- 
ally identical eyes from different embryonic materials by 
species belonging to wl~olly independent branches of evolu- 
tion stretches the explanatory power of chance variations to 
the limits of improbability. Equally implausible in Danvin- 
ian terms are various cases, cited by Bergson, in which a 
favorable variation requires the previous occurrence and re- 
tention of another variation, which, however, itself performs 
no ascertainable function save to prepare for the arrival of 
t l ~ e  advantageous variation yet to come. We do not ourselves 
have to judge the truth of these examples in order to appreci- 
ate how conscientiously Bergson reckoned with the best 
available scientgc knowledge. He sought to write for sci- 
entist as well as for philosopher, for he believed, on carefully 
examined grounds, that the mechanistic version of evolution 
simply failed in application. 
Creative evolution is the antithesis of mechanism. Every 
form of mechanism assumes determinism. Every event has a 
necessary and sufficient cause-ad infiniturn. This means, as 
Bergson correctly insisted, that "all is given7'-everything is 
settled forever. But evolution requires novelty, else nothing 
has happened. The key to innovation is invention, creativity. 
The course of evolution cannot be pre-determined either by 
material or by final causes. The surge of life expresses its own 
inner need, but it does not move inexorably toward fore- 
ordained goals. I t  must endlessly discover the range of its 
possible satisfactions by inventing or devising new expres- 
sions of vitality. 
On the cosmic scale, time assumes a new value. I t  is real 
where new achievements are being created. It is nullified by 
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mechanism, which treats time as just another dimension of 
space. Mathematical models of events treat motion as a ser- 
ies of instantaneous positions, which might just as well co- 
exist like a stack of snapshots. For Bergson this falsifies veri- 
fiable fact. It is useful for certain purposes, but as theory it 
runs counter to the simplest experience of motion, which is 
indivisible. I can move my hand from point A to point B in a 
single motion. If I should, instead, stop at some intervening 
point C, then it would take a new act, another motion, to go 
from C to B. A line AB can be divided into two segments AC 
and BC. The lines are static spatial figures. The motion AC 
is indivisable; it is temporal. 
On the small scale, as well as on the cosmic scale, Bergson 
maintains the alliance of time and vitality, effort, creativity. 
At the most profound level of his criticism he recognizes that 
the problem of novelty forming the philosophical crux of 
evolutionism arises anew with the occurrence of each particu- 
lar event-for example, each single motion. He takes the high 
line, not compromising with traditional habits of thought: 
there is motion but no mobile, no abiding substance that 
moves. The last drastic consequence of the notion of evolu- 
tion is the denial of substance as something absolved of par- 
ticipation in the universal flux. The basic reality is event, 
process, motion. But motion here means the movement of 
life, the surge of life, self-renewing, profoundly imbued with 
ancient memories, striving now for nameless enrichment of 
the future. 
With the sensitivity of a poet and the merciless criticism 
of a logician, Bergson stated, though he hardly solved, the 
problems evolution poses for philosopl~y : time, process, nov- 
elty, satisfaction. 
Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity7 carried the 
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philosophical elaboration of the idea of evolution to its logi- 
cal conclusion in one direction, at least. Alexander shows no 
trace of interest in BergsonPs impressionistic, almost romantic 
intuition of the surge of life. He could not, like Dewey, be 
content with evolution as simply one great scientific dis- 
covery having powerful implications concerning humanity. 
For Alexander, if evolution figured significantly in the world, 
it must be systematically involved in all that happens, and 
the way it is involved must be describable. In particular, the 
evolutionary principle should be observable at levels where 
nobody would ordinarily recognize the occurrence of life; it 
should, in a word, manifest itself physically as well as bio- 
logically, psychologically, and sociologically. 
Like other evolutionists, Alexander-to echo his phrase- 
took time seriously, and the special way in which he did so 
defines the originality of his contribution. The essence of 
evolution he saw in the occurrence of novelty. Unlike Berg- 
son before him and Whitehead after him, he did not deal in- 
tensively with the inescapable novelty of every actual occur- 
rence. Evolutionary novelty for Alexander meant primarily a 
generalized "origin of species," the appearance of some ab- 
solutely new kind of actuality on the cosmic scene. To desig- 
nate this concept of absolute innovation he borrowed the 
tern "emergent evolution" from the British biologist Lloyd 
Morgan, to whose book by that title Alexander appropriately 
acknowledged owing much more than a convenient expres- 
sion. The antithesis of emergent evolution is what we may 
call reductionist evolution, if it is entitled to share the name 
"evoIution" at all. I t  assumes that the higher evolutionary 
stage could be, with sufficient knowledge, computed or 
otherwise derived from antecedent conditions involving only 
entities at a lower stage. According to the idea of emergent 
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evolution, there comes a moment when a wholly new prop- 
erty emerges from a given complication of prior existents. 
The most familiar example of emergence is the appearance of 
life when certain physico-chemical conditions are satisfied; 
but Alexander finds many emergents in the evolution of the 
present state of the cosmos. 
Another feature of "emergence7' must be emphasized. The 
emergent, though irreducible to lower modes, yet depends 
upon the lower for its existence; on the other hand, the emer- 
gent deteimines its lower constituents to modes of behavior 
that they could not by themselves adopt. There is no life, 
for example, where there are no physico-chemical processes 
of organic physiology. But the animate body behaves in ways 
impossible to inanimate bodies. There is no conscious men- 
tality apart from life; but mentality enables living bodies to 
behave in wholly new ways. 
If we adopt Alexander's hypothesis that our cosmos has 
evolved by a series of emergent originations to its present 
intricacy and its subtlety of response, we must also follow his 
lead in back-tracking down the path of evolution to the most 
primitive conceivable origins. Space-Time is his name for the 
primordial basis of all existence. Time is as primitive as 
space; in fact, it could not be othenvise since each requires 
the other. Bare space and bare time, extreme abstractions 
from the real tissue of events, cannot actually exist. Descartes 
had identified physical nature with that which is spatial and 
left time a mystery referred to the continual creation of God; 
Bergson had treated the physicist's space as a fiction, a falss- 
cation of fact if not quite a fraud, whereas time expressed the 
creative surging of life; Alexander rescued elements of truth 
in both views by making use of ideas derived from relativity 
physics. He made the first thoroughly reasoned attempt to 
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bring specifically physical events into inteIIigibIe relation 
with evolutionary process. 
That is Alexander's importance to the present study. We 
need not consider how he attempts to show that the three 
dimensions of space require and are required by the three as- 
pects of time (continuous duration in succession, irreversi- 
bility, betweenness); or how he traces the successive emer- 
gence of the sensible qualities, materiality, vitality, men- 
tality, value, and the prospective emergence of a next higher 
but unknowable quality of "deity"; or how he constructs a 
realistic theory of categories as part of a thoroughly realistic 
epistemology. He presents us with the traditional hierarchy 
of space (-time), matter, life, mind, and God, but now trans- 
lated from static into temporal terms, from structural into 
evolutionary metaphors. The relation of the emergent to that 
on which it supervenes is in many respects identical with the 
relation of form to proximate matter in Aristotle. It is hard 
for us today to read Aristotle's description of the various 
stages of life ("soul")-vegetable, sensient, rational-in his so- 
called Psychology without reading evolutionary ideas into it. 
I t  might be no less d scu l t  for Aristotle to read Alexander 
without reading his doctrine of formal hierarchies into the 
evolutionary picture. But beneath the undeniable similarity 
of these views, they project hierarchies of drastically con- 
trasting types. The Aristotelian has a fixed goal, luring matter 
to meet its requirements. For Alexander, the emergent is (on 
the surface, at least) an unaccountable, a strictly empirical 
by-product of a chance complication of simpler processes. 
Space-time and Deity denote opposite ends of the evolu- 
tionary scale. But what entitles Alexander to the assumption 
that "later" means "'higher," that the more complexly condi- 
tioned emergent is better than the less? What entitles Alex- 
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ander to the assumption that evolution has an inevitably pro- 
gressive tendency? How does he know that our aspiring after 
righteousness is not illusion? Perhaps there will be no next 
emergent-emergence is purely a matter of empirical fact, 
by definition incapable of rational anticipation. Perhaps the 
"deity" next emerging will turn out to be devilish. 
In considering the course of evolution as the record of an 
upward trend in the cosmos, Alexander tacitly attributes an 
ambiguous role to "deity." The next higher stage can lure the 
effort of the lower only if somehow it enters already into the 
being of the lower stage. This suggests a bias in the universe, 
an implicit movement by 'love," by need, desire, yearning, 
aspiration-in short, a God above and beyond the contin- 
gencies of the evolutionary process to underwrite a coming 
next emergent. Time must be taken seriously, yes; but it 
must also be seen in relation to significance beyond space- 
time. Evolutionary philosophy, we may summarize in con- 
clusion, raised questions it did not answer. But they were 
fundamental questions which philosophers ought to take 
seriously. 
Alfred North Whitehead read Bergson and learned from 
him, as he read and appreciated James and Dewey. He also 
refers to Space, Time and Deity, but he made little or no use 
of it. Actually, his mind owed more to the classical philo- 
sophers, particularly Plato and Locke, than to any of his 
philosophical contemporaries. The contemporary ideas that 
compelled his respect came from the technical precision and 
virtuosity of recent mathematics and symbolic logic and from 
the twentieth-century revolution in physics, But to speak of 
"influences7' on Whitehead's thought diverts attention from 
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the point of real importance: whatever he learned from others 
was transmuted by the alchemy of genius. 
We have now entered upon the third and last stage of the 
philosophical adventures of the idea of evolution in the cen- 
tury since 1859. This is the stage of tile eclipse of the idea 
as a powerful speculative tool. Whitehead belongs somewhat 
ambiguously to this stage. He has much more in common 
with the major philosophers of evolution than with the posi- 
tivists (of whom he was unsparingly and unanswerably criti- 
cal) or the existentialists, to whom the most recent years owe 
a new phiIosophica1 note, He was interested in the same kinds 
of problems as Dewey, Bergson, and Alexander were inter- 
ested in, but with superior refinement of vision and coher- 
ence of constluction and was unresponsive to sweeping nega- 
tions by which positivists secured their narrow field of vision, 
and to equally sweeping though radically different negations 
by which the existentialists secured theirs. On the other hand, 
Whitehead makes no more than incidental and passing refer- 
ence to the idea of evolution in his great constivctive works. 
The notion of evolution which we find in Darwin and Dewey, 
or in Alexander or, indeed, in Bergson, contributed little or 
nothing to the finished architecture of his thougl~t. White- 
head took little interest in the origin of species; more basic 
than that and required for its evolutionary interpretation is 
adequate insight into the origin of individual entities. His 
genius focused with blinding brilliance on the basic innova- 
tion of mature evolutionism, an innovation upon which all 
the men we have discussed have relied without subjecting all 
its aspects to thorough analysis. Whitehead's debt to evolu- 
tionary philosophy went deep, for he owed to it his most basic 
question: how can we interpret process as reality? Bergson 
had spoken of motion without a mobile, but he offered only 
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a most impressionistic intuition of its nature, Dewey was of- 
ten much closer to Whitehead because of his concentration 
on the passing adventures of actual situations; but, intent on 
other issues, he passed over the problems that absorbed 
Whitehead. With incomparable tenacity Whitehead wrestled 
with the problem of the coming-to-be of every individual 
event or "actual occasion," "actual entity," 'bccasion of ex- 
perience." 
All this carries us away from evolution as a constructive 
principle. That is how, in a most general sense, Whitehead 
contributed to the eclipse of evolutionary philosophy. His 
problem placed the central emphasis in a new place, and his 
systematic treatment of it reinforced this displacement. I t  is 
necessary to say a word about this in order ro give substance 
to these very general interpretations; anybody acquainted 
with his works will know in advance that certain hints are 
all that a brief sketch can offer. 
Whitehead's problem is not creative evolution but creative 
process, not emergent evolution of new qualities in the cos- 
mos but emergence of new actuality each moment; not nov- 
elty of form or quality or species, but novelty of individual 
existence. Whitehead saw that creativity, though for him 
the ultimate cosmic principle, has its workshop, as it were, in 
individual actualities, or actual occasions. In the particular 
occasion, moreover, creativity is not absolute, but conditioned 
by relevant past actuality as a whole. The occasion owes the 
materials of its actuality to environing events that spread out 
to it in time, but it incorporates them into itself according to 
its own immanent self-constituting tendency, or "subjective 
aim," and thus realizes itself-achieves its little moment of 
creative actuality in a unique satisfaction. Thus it is that 
every entity comes to be. 
24 The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
Just as things that have happened, "the past," communi- 
cate themselves to the self-constituting present actuality, so 
each actual occasion in turn gives itseIf to the uses of future 
actuality. In this sense, though eveiy 6nite actuality has its 
little moment of satisfaction and is no more, it never passes 
away into absolute nothingness as if it had never been. Every 
actuality enjoys what Whitehead calls "objective immortal- 
ity." However insignificant an occasion may be, it makes just 
that insignscant but ineradicable actual difference to reality. 
An actual difference is one that nothing but an actuality can 
possibly make. It may be transformed by actual entities into 
which it subsequently enters or it may be ignored, resisted, 
rejected, but it cannot be made nothing. 
Each individual occasion, event, or entity emerges 
uniquely from the past. I t  is a new actuality, an authentic 
emergent novelty. But Whitehead does not leave the notion 
of emergence, as Alexander did, on the level of unintelligible 
empirical fact that has to be accepted with "natural piety." 
For him, the process of coming-to-be involves the actual op- 
eration of both efficient and final causes. If achieved actual- 
ity did not transmit itseIf immediately to emerging actuality, 
then process would have nothing on which to work; on the 
otl~er hand, if the entity in process of coming to be did not 
impose its own intrinsic tendency, or subjective aim, on the 
process by selecting some and rejecting other genuine alter- 
natives available to it in a red  future, then nothing would 
ever really happen, since then everything would already 
have been settled. Thus it is equally impossible to conceive 
of actual process without efficient causes and to conceive of 
it without final causes, Every actual entity is determined by 
the conditions of its origination, but it is also free in the reali- 
zation of its own aim and the enjoyment of its own '"atis- 
faction," or moment of indefeasible actual existence. 
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Whitehead's explicit adoption of final causes into his cos- 
mology teaches one of the decisive lessons concerning the 
revolution in modern thought -to which evolutionary ideas 
contributed. Evolutionism brought to philosophical attention 
the fertility of time, and it is in this way that it influenced 
philosophy most profoundly. It led to a radical revision of the 
mechanistic metaphor that defined the original bias of mod- 
em philosophy. Whitehead was fully aware of this change 
and stressed it by insisting on a philosophy of organism, 
rather than of mechanism. Bergson himself had demanded a 
changed outlook in his striking criticism of physical science, 
but he did not make plain the role of final causes in the crea- 
tive unfolding of time. Whitehead did so, and thereby re- 
turned philosophy to classical models; his philosophy, the 
most independent and most up-to-date speculative effort of 
this century, belongs unmistakably to the Platonic tradition. 
I t  remains only to suggest Whitehead's manner of meeting 
questions that Bergson, Alexander, and Dewey left in ob- 
scurity. In one way or another each had posed but not an- 
swered the problem of cosmic teleology. Bergson's surge of 
life is a frankly teleological creative principle. But in his anx- 
iety to reject a universe in which everything was forever 
predetermined, whether by mechanical or by final causes, he 
left the teleology of the 61an vital ambiguous and confused. 
The surge of life does not know in advance what it aims at 
-so be it! But if even matter is a by-product of life, then the 
surge of life must be wholly indifferent to what happens-one 
thing being as welcome as another-or else it must seek 
modes of actuality harmonious with its own intrinsic nature 
as life. Life seeks life, not non-life. But Bergson never clari- 
fies this adequately. Alexander too, we saw, had a tacit teleol- 
ogy of emergence to which the radically empirical notion of 
de facto emergence scarcely entitles him. Dewey, for his 
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part, always assumes that "nature" includes as real possibili- 
ties all the moments of genuine goodness that inteUigent con- 
duct can bring about. This means that nature provides for 
man's purposes. But in teims of his naturalism, this must re- 
main for Dewey an article of unsupported faith. 
Whitehead realized that a world of process, of true self- 
realizing activity, required a pHilosophica1 ground in an ade- 
quate theology. The details of Whitehead's theology, cer- 
tainly in itself a topic worthy of painstaking examination, 
do not matter to the present study. I t  is enough to point out 
his conclusion that process can be understood as real only 
if it is conceived to be involved in an eternal ground. This is 
the aspect of God which he calls His "primordial nature," the 
immanent tendency of process, the bias in things that favors 
certain possible futures over others, the inalterable estabIish- 
ment of the abstract order of value or importance in the uni- 
verse. I t  is by reference to this scale that developments may 
be 'l~igher" or 'lower" as well as simply later. 
Whitehead does not intend this conception to imply the 
kind of inflexible determination of the world by final cause 
to which Bergson objected. His whole emphasis celebrates 
the freedom of each individual occasion to shape its own 
being-however crudely. The outcome of world-process is not 
foreordained; there is still genuine contingency in process- 
the future dl. be as it is made. Thus if God is not simply 
an abstraction or a remote and indifferent spectator (after 
the fashion of Plato's worst kind of atheism), He must have 
a constant concern for the adventures of free process. Thus 
God has His "consequent nature," in Whitehead's language. 
He needs the world, as the world needs Him. He allows it 
free activity and the time of real novelties, but redeems all 
the inevitable inadequacies of limited entities. Real time, in 
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short, requires for its rational comprehension a thoroughly 
examined theology; but it is a theology as new as the con- 
ception of real time, if Whitehead understood it aright. 
Whitehead does not hold forth expectations of inevitable 
progress to higher levels of realization. Evolution, in this 
sense, he leaves behind. He directs attention to questions 
at once more novel and more traditional than those of the 
major evolutionist philosophers, He deals profoundly with 
the most basic question raised by evolutionism, and by doing 
so transcends the provincialism inherent in an idea derived 
from a single scientific realm. 
In 1929, when his Gifford Lectures, The Quest for Cer- 
tainty, appeared, Dewey was already seventy years of age. 
Whitehead's major works were describing nature in a new 
way. Alexander's work was done. Bergson had published 
little for many years; and though a few years later he would 
again present a masterpiece to the world, The Two Sowces 
of Morality and Religion, it would be his swan song-and 
that of evolutionism, too-as a creative factor in philosophi- 
cal thought. Already Bertrand Russell's "scientific method in 
philosophy," his 'logical analysis," had spread via Ludwig 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosop12icus (1920) to the 
European continent. There, in the late 'twenties and early 
'thirties, this methodical tendency was converted into an un- 
compromising philosophy by Rudolph Carnap, Otto Neurath, 
Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach, and other members of the 
"Vienna Circle." This view married traditional positivistic 
attitudes to the analytical techniques of symbolic logic and 
utterly rejected all "metapl~ysics," including, of course, evo- 
lutionism. This movement was joined by the indigenously 
English movement of philosophical or linguistic analysis, 
which owes much to G. E. Moore's 'ccommon-sense" approach, 
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as well as to Wittgenstein's later teaching. Though they differ 
in important respects, we may for the sake of brevity treat 
them as allies in promoting analytic philosophy. 
In exactly the same short span of years, another move- 
ment of thought on the Continent had suddenly gathered 
impressive momentum because of Martin Heidegger's work 
of genius, Sein und Zeit (1927). The title, ordinarily trans- 
lated Being and Time, may be more pointedly rendered Real- 
ity and Process, to emphasize the coincidence of its publica- 
tion at almost the same time as Whitehead's Process and 
Reality (1929); but two less similar works would be hard to 
imagine. Sein und Zeit served notice that the German vogue 
of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in the miserable years follow- 
ing the shattering experience of the First World War had had 
profoundly important consequences. It was soon recognized 
that somewhat similar things were already being said by 
Kai.1 Jaspers, who had come to philosophy through the prac- 
tice of psychiatry, the effort to understand his patients hav- 
ing brought him to reflect on the inmost attitudes of every 
mind, beyond reach of reason and persuasion. 
This "existentialist" movement took human life on its in- 
side at the level of its deepest commitments. In so doing, it 
turned squarely against the whole pursuit of "objectivity" 
characteristic of the modern intellectual epoch. An evolution- 
asy metaphysics becomes not merely false or even "meaning- 
less" (as positivists might have said) but isrelevant. It has 
sinlply nothing to do with the continuing crisis which is the 
burden of life for each individual one of us. 
In the English-speaking world, so many philosophers have 
worked at analysis of one kind or another that a recent popu- 
lar paperback, purporting to offer a characteristic sample of 
twentieth-century phiIosophica1 wsiting, is called The Age 
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of Analysis, A European, or even a Latin American, if he 
prepared a similar volume, might well name it The  Age of 
Existentialism. I t  might include excerpts from Marcel and 
Sartre, from Heideggel; Jaspers, and Paul Tillich, from 
Martin Buber, from Nicolas Berdyaev, and from others. Only 
for the English-speaking among Western peoples has this 
way of approaching the reflective tasks of life had little ap- 
peal; though even here we must make an exception of 
theologians, many of whom have borrowed existentialist for- 
mulz to express their religious intuitions. 
These two movements, then, existential and analytical, 
have eclipsed older ways of doing metaphysics, one attack- 
ing from the subjective and the other from the objective side. 
Both have too much scope and variety even for the most cur- 
sory treatment in this paper; but it would be improper to 
close without indicating with more precision, though very 
briefly, the attitudes they take toward problems interesting 
to evolutionary pl~ilosophers. 
In a variety of ways analytical philosophers have centered 
their interest on making clear what our languages, customary 
and contrived, mean. This activity tends to assume for them 
the whole identity of philosophical practice. Empirical ques- 
tions belong to science, which offers the only tested methods 
of verification. Other seemingly empirical questions, includ- 
ing many traditionally discussed by learned philosophers, 
turn out, they say, to concein matters of linguistic usage or 
of logical syntax. In any case, questions of process, of 
novelty, of emergence, of creativity, of cosmic teleology are 
either handed over to natural science or are reduced to prob- 
lems of usage, customary or technical. Philosophy in the 
grand manner-Bergson's, Alexander's, Dewey's, Whitehead's 
-is simply not attempted, Cosmology, evolutionary or not, 
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may afford some subjective comfort to men's feelings but 
cannot make good any claim to rigorous critical objectivity. 
Existentialism for its part does not simply look the other 
way in passing by traditional metaphysics. I t  transforms the 
central n~etaphysical question. Speaking largely with Heideg- 
ger in view, we may say that the time of his basic philosophi- 
cal reflection is not the time of physics or of evolution, or 
even, quite, of Whitehead's process. It is the subjective time 
of the agony of decision, of dread of ultimate responsibility, 
of coneei-n for finding something worthwhile to a temporal 
being lost in a wasteland of meaninglessness. Time for the 
existentialist connotes finitude, the crushing burden of tem- 
porality. His distress reaches its highest pitch in his aware- 
ness that as a being bound to time he is constantly giving 
himself actuality by inward affirmation of this or that altei-na- 
tive. He precariously holds on to his little moment of be- 
ing by projecting himself into, or dangling himself over, the 
abyss of sheer nothingness, while the aid he needs and seeks 
withholds itself or turns away. This tui-ning away, says 
Neidegger, is an occurrence in time-that is, a definite em- 
pirical event in human inward existence. Being is a crea- 
tivity that yields the only possible answer to the question of 
questions: why is there something rather than nothing? We 
are ourselves beings, the plural pointing to our finitude. We 
in a way know, or at least surmise, Being or Reality, because 
we are ourselves beings and are real. But the point of the 
story escapes us. We know that we are temporary, as well as 
temporal beings: we shall die. Each day lights our path to 
dusty death. We did not choose to live; yet here we are, 
cast up on the shores of life, to make our way without sign- 
posts to-death. Why is there something rather than nothing? 
The point escapes us. Heideggex never, I think, ventures 
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beyond this doubt; his self-appointed task is to bring home 
to others the tiue desperateness of the human situation. But 
his later writings hint perhaps at an answer like Job's. Cer- 
tainly other existentialists hasten-much more eagerly-to the 
reassurance of a traditional theological conclusion. 
Sketchy as this portrayal undeniably is, it will surely un- 
derscore enough the existentialist's total diversion of atten- 
tion from objective questions of fact and cosmos. What am 
I doing here? is their problem, and they have no genuine 
interest whatever in what here is, and how it came to be as it 
is. The metaphysics of evolution is in full eclipse. 
But must it so remain? When analysis and existentialism 
have mellowed and abandoned their exaggerations, will new 
appreciation of evolution be born? 
That is a question for the next century, not for the years 
1859-1959. 
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